



THE
PRESENT INTEREST
OF THE
PEOPLE
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN
CONSIDER'D.

THE
PRESENT INTEREST
OF THE
PEOPLE
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN,

At Home and Abroad, consider'd:
In a LETTER to a MEMBER
of PARLIAMENT.

Quamobrem, P C, erigite Animos, retinete vestram dignitatem: manet illa in Repub. bonorum consensus: dolor accessit bonis Viris, virtus non est imminuta: Nihil est damni factum novi, sed quod erat inventum est; In unius hominis perditu judicio plures Similes reperti sunt.

Cicer. Frag. ad Att:

L O N D O N:

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The present Interest of the People of
GREAT-BRITAIN *at Home and*
Abroad consider'd.

To * * *

S I R,



S I have an Esteem for your Person, I cannot be unconcern'd with Regard to your future Reputation and Character, which must in a great Measure be determin'd by your Conduct at this important Juncture.

Virtuous Popularity, is what no honest Man *can*, and no wise Man *will*, now despise. For the Points now to be settled in the political System regard neither the *preference of Persons*, nor the *Modes of Government*, but immediately affect the *fundamental Rights and Independency* of this Country. The *Infamy* therefore attending a *wrong* Conduct at such a *Crisis*, may be *irretrievable* by the most disinterested Con-

duct for the future; and aggravated with this melancholy Reflection, that the *perpetual Inability* you must be under of repairing *past*, or preventing *future Evils*, will be in some Measure, *of your own creating*.

As I never was a Friend to *general* Declamation, I will begin what I have to say on this Subject by answering some Arguments, which you told me your Friends urged in Justification of their own Conduct upon a late Occasion. These, as regarding foreign Affairs, if I remember right, were founded upon three Propositions, which before I proceed to our Domestic Concerns, I will state as fairly, and answer as solidly, as I can.

That the Power of *France* must be reduced, and the House of *Austria* supported.

That the present M——y have pursued the most effectual and prudent Conduct for both these Purposes. And

That their Measures have hitherto been attended with all the Success that could have been expected.

Tho' these are three distinct Propositions, yet as not any one of them can be consider'd seperately from the other, I shall take the Liberty of offering my Sentiments upon the whole.

I entirely agree, that this Nation and Government cannot be too jealous of the Power of *France*; but at the same Time I
humbly

humbly apprehend, that the only Connection that we can, or ought to have with the House of *Austria* is, to take Care least any Part of its Dominions should become an Acquisition to encrease that Power, or that the Dominions in that Family shou'd be so divided, as to render it too weak for opposing *France*.

I shall not at present enter into any Disquisition of a Question, that has again and again been discussed, I mean, *whether it was not by the Conduct of the late M——y that France became powerful, and the House of Austria reduced?* This I think is admitted now in the Affirmative almost on all Hands; but I cannot help observing, that the late M——r, bad as he was, had always one Reason, which tho' it did not *justify*, yet it *supported* him under all the *insolent Provocations* we met with, under all the *interesting Points* we gave up, and in all the *rapacious Invasions* of Right and Property, which our Friends on the Continent suffered from the Power of *France*. The Reason I hint at, is *the Regard he had for certain Dominions, which both politically and naturally, can have no manner of Connection with the Dominions of Great-Britain*. Your Friends therefore would do a very great Service both to the Government and the Public, if they will shew, that the Cause I have mention'd does not still subsist; and if the Cause subsists, tho' under different

different Appearances, the Effects must still be the same. It is in vain therefore, that Gentlemen pretend to amuse the Public with a *specious general Declaration*, that what they do is *in order to humble France*, while it is on the other Hand evident, that they are encouraging that Spirit, and pursuing those very Measures, by which *France*, if she is now too powerful, became so, and by which the House of *Austria*, if it is now too weak, is reduced. Therefore in fair Reasoning, if these Gentlemen mean what they give out, they ought to begin with saying, *We will have no Regard to any Consideration that is foreign to the Interest of Great-Britain, however dear it may be to some particular Members of its Government.* Unless they resolve to follow this Conduct, even admitting their Spirit and Zeal which they show for reducing *France* to be *sincere*, yet it never can be *effectual* for any other Purpose, than that of *ruining Great-Britain*, by creating *expensive Parades, burthensome Taxes, and impolitic Alliances.* Has our present M—y with all the *promptitude* of their *Courage*, with all the *Heat* of their *Passion* against *France*, given any one Proof that they are not equally tender of the Consideration I have hinted at, with their Predecessor, who is now, perhaps principally for that very Reason, the Object of *public Reproach and*
Execra-

Execration? The Forces we ſent over, were they not juſt ſufficient for diverting the Storm from certain Dominions, but ineffectual for either curbing the Efforts *France* was making againſt the Houſe of *Austria*, or ſtriking any Blow that might redound to the Honour or Intereſt of *Great-Britain*? Will any Man upon the Principles of common Senſe and Reaſon ſay, that our *whole* View was to diſtreſs *France*, and aſſiſt the Queen of *Hungary*, if it ſhould be prov'd that our ſending thoſe Forces over was abſolutely in Contradiſtion to an expreſs Declaration of the *States-General*, *That they could not without the greateſt Concern, ſee any Part of the Britiſh Forces in the Auſtrian Netherlands?* But as theſe are Facts that will come more properly under the ſecond Propoſition I undertook to ſpeak of, I ſhall proceed to ſome Facts that are more explicate, and which I think leave no Room for doubting, from what Motive, and with what View, all this Spirit againſt the Power of *France* is purſued.

Immediately after the Diſmiſſion of the laſt M——r, a Nobleman of great Merit was ſent for, like *Cincinnatus* from the Plow, who was to revive the Spirit of the great Alliance, and to renew the Confidence which naturally ought to ſubſiſt between the *States-General* and *Great-Britain*. This undoubtedly was a very wiſe Step, and from
the

the happy Change of our M——y in *England*, great Expectations arose, that the Confidence of the *Dutch* in our Councils would be renewed from the apparent Union that was likely to be effected betwixt the People and the Court of G——t B——n. Accordingly our Ambassador extraordinary was receiv'd with great Ceremony, and I believe with great Affection at the *Hague*; an Audience was demanded, granted and past, with almost unprecedented Formality. But what was the Event? He begins with general Propositions, which are no more than common Form, containing the readiness of the King his Master, to cultivate a perfect Friendship with the Republic, and an Encomium upon their Ancestors, who had so bravely asserted their own Liberty, and that of *Europe*. He then comes to a particular Proposition, and if I remember right, the only particular one in his whole Speech, and therefore we may conclude, it was the only particular one in all his Commission, *viz.* an Offer from his Majesty as E—— of —— to enter into an Alliance with their High Mightinesses. It may perhaps be not so proper to say all that one could say upon this Occasion, I shall however take the Liberty of making a few Remarks, observing all the while the *greatest Decency* as to *Persons*, and the *strictest Veracity* as to *Facts*.

Whatever

Whatever speculative Notions, may in some Councils and Assemblies be urged, as to the Independency and Distinction of Interests *betwixt two States who are under the same Head*, Yet I am afraid it will be found a very hard Task to persuade the World in general, that any such *Independency* can subsist but in ^(a) *Idea*; The *Dutch* had already seen the fatal Disability which the Queen of *H——y* was under of making Head against her Enemies in *Germany*, from the strong Attack made upon her Hereditary Dominions in *Italy*, by Means of a certain Neutrality. The Effects which this Neutrality had produced, by the inactivity of the *British* Fleet, convinced them how chimerical such Distinctions as I have

B mentioned

(^a) *An ingenious Foreigner, a great Favourer of the House of H——r, and who is generally thought to write the Sense of Foreign States, has the following remarkable Expressions. Si l'on joint à cette Consideration celle que ce Prince est Roy de la grand Bretagne, quell poid, cette puissant Couronne ne donne telle pas a son Credit dans l'Empire ; Car quoiqu'il soit certain que Parlement de la Grand Bretagne n'est pas obligé de prendre la défense des Etats hereditaires de sa Maj. Brit. il est fort apparent que si ce Prince y etoit atterqué, La Nation Britanique, ne Seroit pas de derniers a voler à son secours.*

In English thus, If we add to this Consideration, that this Prince (the E——r of H——r) is King of Great Britain, what Weight must not this Powerful Crown give his Credit in the Empire ? For tho' 'tis true, that the Parliament of Great-Britain is not obliged to defend the Electoral Dominions of their King, yet 'tis very evident, that if that Prince was attacked there, the British Nation would be amongst the first to fly to his Assistance.

mentioned are. They had seen the King of G——-B——'s M——-r, as E—— of H——, joining in the Choice of a *French* Emperor, who had but one Negative in all the Electoral College ; they had heard, that on *February 25, Te Deum had been sung in all the Churches of H——, for the Election of a new Emperor.* Nay, the public New-writers there, where the Government is absolute, and where they cannot suppose any Thing is inserted without proper Authority, had the Insolence to tell the World, That *We hear the Neutrality Convention between this E——te and France, has been renewed for a Year.* They had been informed of the Loyalty of the H——n, M——r, who, at the Emperor's Coronation, scattered Medals among the Populace ; and they themselves from all these Appearances, had perhaps from a principal of *political Caution*, though with all the Marks of *heart reluctance*, actually sent a Letter of Congratulation to the Emperor upon his Election. While Matters were in this Situation, and the *French* Army under *Maillebois*, hovering about the Borders of *Westphalia*, with what View could the *Dutch* think such an Alliance was proposed ? To strengthen the good Understanding betwixt them and *Great-Britain.* But what Strength could this good Understanding receive from the Accession of a
Power

Power who had given evident Demonstration, that she wanted either Inclination or Ability, to refuse the Shackles which had then been forged for the Liberties of *Europe*. If the Want of Inclination was the Case, which I am far from thinking; how was such a Power to be trusted? If the Want of Ability, how could it be serviceable to the common Cause? It might indeed have been extremely convenient for such a Power to have been a principal contracting Party in an Alliance with two great States, who might have thereby been obliged to defend *it* against the Ambition of *France*. But surely it must prove a Weak Accession to, if not a dead Weight upon any great Alliance, especially after suffering itself to be bullied by *Maillebois* 25000 Tatterdemallions in *Westphalia*.

I shall however, for Arguments Sake, admit, That the Conduct of a certain E——te, was influenc'd by neither of those Motives, but by a justifiable Concern to avert the Terrors of Fire and Sword from a Country dear by every Eye both of *Nature* and *Interest*. But if this was the Case, I should be glad to know, whether we can suppose a Time to happen when the same Reason for Compliance to the Will of *France* will not exist, if that Court shall think proper to apply the same Means? If 25 or 30,000 Men are sufficient for forcing

the Government of that E—te into any Measure, however inconsistent with the Liberties of *Europe*, and the Interest of *Great-Britain*, that *France* shall prescribe, can we imagine it will not be worth while for *France* to bend even the main Stress of her Power against those Dominions, especially as she can thereby turn the Scale so as to depress the most public Spirited Measures that can be concerted, and over-turn the Operations of the strongest Alliance that can possibly be form'd to preserve the Balance of Power? If such an Event can be brought about, (and recent Experience gives us but too melancholy Grounds to believe that it may) what Security can this Nation have, that her most favourite Views will not be disappointed? Or, what reliance can our Allies have, that they will not be left in the Lurch, as soon as such another Concurrence of Causes happen? It will always be in the Power of the Court of *Versailles* to spare Forces enough for this Purpose; nay, should she leave her own Frontiers defenceless of all but her Garrisons, she will gain infinitely more by a proper *Feint* on this Quarter, than she can expect to gain by a dozen successful Campaigns on the Side of *Flanders*.

These Considerations I think will evidently demonstrate to any Man who understands the Interest of *Great-Britain*, that
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the first Step, one who wishes his Country well, ought to take, is to endeavour to convince our natural Allies, that the Parliament of *Great-Britain* will enter into Measures against *France*, upon a disinterested and independent Footing; upon such a Footing as to convince them, that they have no other Views, no other Motives, but the Good of *Great - Britain*, which to every Man of Common Sense, will appear as inseparably connected with the Interests of the House of *Austria*, and those of the *States-General*. But then, on the other Hand, a Measure may be *expedient*, and yet not *necessary*; it may even in one Respect be *necessary*, and yet the Execution of it may produce a *greater Evil*, that even the *Obtemperance* of that *Necessity* can prevent. To humble the Power of *France*, is a Measure always *expedient* for us to pursue; at present it may be *necessary*, but the Question is, Whether our pursuing, or our Appearing to pursue, even this *necessary* Measure may not produce an Evil that it may be still more *necessary* to prevent.

We at present groan under an immense Load of Debt, but that I will not urge as a Reason why we ought not to incur more Debts, that we may pull *France* down. We have a very formidable Standing Army, but I shall be even for encreasing that Army, in order to attain that desirable End. The
Nation

Nation has an universal Distrust of the M—y. Yet I am for trusting them while they engage heartily and vigorously to pursue this flattering Measure. But I believe you will think that no *Englishman* of Sense will upon the Plausibility of that Pretext, be brought to vote, that *Great-Britain* shall engage into such a System of Expence, as shall plunge her into a Debt, which will immediately and unavoidably bring her into all those Miseries she dreads at a Distance from *France*; and even after those Expences are incurr'd, the Prospect of Success may remain still precarious. No Man who loves Liberty of his Country, will vote for encreasing the standing Army to such a Number as may be formidable to ourselves, without being effectual against our Enemies. No Gentleman who understands the Interests of this Country, will care to trust any M—ry who in *Words* expresses a Passion against the Power of *France*, and in *Actions*, a Resolution to undermine the Constitution of *Britain*; the Preservation of which, is the only Reason why we ought to wish that the Power of *France* should be reduc'd. Yet, 'tis as evident, as any Demonstration in Mathematics, that should *Great-Britain*, upon the Strength of a Mercenary Alliance with a Power to whose Safety the Interests of *Europe* have already been given up, enter into this War without the Con-
currence

currence and Assistance of the *Dutch*, we have all those Evils to *dread*, nay to *expect*. The Debts we contract, will become indissoluble, which will render us *Bankrupts*: The Consequence of which will be, that the Army we now *pay*, when we can *pay* them no longer, will *pay* them themselves ; thus we shall become *Slaves* : The whole beautiful Frame of our Constitution must then be alter'd into Military Government, supported by Mercenary Forces, till we become a Province to that Power, whose Interest is strongest in the Army, or whose Force is superiour in the Field.

I know, Sir, you will now think that I have gone too far, and that I am become an Advocate against a War with the *French*; No, I am for entering into a *prudent* War, but not with a War that must *ruin* us without *reducing them*. But are we to be unactive at this Juncture? are we to suffer *France* to go on? Are we not to seize this Opportunity of reducing her Power; merely because the *Dutch* are obstinate? In answer to this, the *Dutch* either have a Reason, or have no Reason for their Conduct, If they have a Reason, it becomes us to do all we can to remove it. It can be founded only upon the Distrust they have of *us*, for if it is founded upon their own Bad Circumstances at Home, that is a Consideration which I believe ought to have as much weight with the *Parliament*

ment of Great-Britain, as with the *Assembly of the States-General*. But by what Means can we remove that Distrust? By the *Parliament of Great-Britain* shewing that they enter into War without any View than the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe*; by convincing our natural Allies, that it will be carry'd on as the War of the *People of Great-Britain*, and not as the War of the *G—nt*. But how does it become less the War of the People of *Great-Britain* by *H—n* Troops being taken into the *British* Pay? As it may be not quite so prudent to give this Question, all the Answer it can admit of, and as in a great Measure it sufficiently answers itself, I shall drop it. I will however beg Leave to throw out one or two Observations.

The Electors of the Empire, are surely obliged to have a more watchful Eye on all Attacks that may be made upon the Liberties of the *Germanic* Body than any other Power; yet not one of those Electors have by their Conduct hitherto given the World any Reason to believe that they resent the Notorious Violations which have been offer'd the Constitution of *Germany*. Had they done this, nay, had any one of them joyn'd boldly and openly with the Queen of *Hungary*, there is the strongest Reason in the World for believing that the other Princes, and the Circles of the Empire, would have oppos'd the March of the *French* Troops.

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Had she been even assisted by the *H—n* Troops, or by those of *Great-Britain*, when the first Attack was made upon her Hereditary Dominions by the King of *Prussia*, it would given such Spirit to all the Powers concerned in supporting the Pragmatic Sanction, that she might have been still in Possession of the undivided Dominions of the House of *Austria*. As this was not the Case, and as no Elector or Prince in the Empire, stood forth the Friend of that Distress'd Princess, with what Face can it be required of *Great-Britain* at this Juncture, to pay those Troops which while they might have been of Service, were of none; and to pay them too after the Season of the Year was too far advanc'd, for them to be of the least Use, either to the Queen of *Hungary*, or the Interests of her Allies.

To prove this, one needs but reflect upon the Pacific Operations which happened all last Year, and on this Side of *Westphalia*. On one Side, lay *Maillebois* with the *French* under his Command; on the other, the *Hannoverians* 26000 strong, and 6000 *Hessians* in *British* Pay, who were order'd to assemble at *Hamelin*, upon the Borders of *Westphalia* on the *Hanover* Side, while the *Hannoverians* were encamped at *Niemberg*. Seven thousand *British* Troops were in readiness to have come over, and 10,000 *Austrians* in the *Low Countries*, were ready like-

wife to have join'd. These Numbers I observe, pretty nearly make up the Force which is now in *Flanders* on the Side of the Queen of *Hungary*, deducting 10,000 *Hannoverians* left at Home; the whole amounting to 49000 Men, all of them the best look'd Troops that have for a long Time been seen in one Body. In the mean Time, the Arms of her *Hungarian* Majesty met with more than expected Success in *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, so that we may reasonably conclude that the least Grain of Force then thrown into the Scale of Victory, must have completely turn'd the Ballance in her Favour.

But what was the Conduct of her Allies? While her Affairs were on this prosperous Turn, and while it was absolutely in their Power to have compleated the utter Ruin of all the *French* who were in *Germany*, not a Motion was made by all this powerful Force to prevent *Maillebois*, from drawing his Troops, in order, towards *Dusseldorp*, and the *Ligeois*, where they lay for 14 Days in scatter'd Bodies, and where they might easily have been surrounded by the Troops of *Hanover* and the *Hessians* in the *British* Pay on the one side, and by those of *Great-Britain*, and the *Austrian* Netherlands on the other. He had sufficient Time for providing Carriages, for erecting Magazines and making all the necessary numerous Dispositions for a March without the least Interruption; and on *August*

gust the 23d, the first Column of his Army arriv'd without Lett or Molestation at Little *Swatbach*, a Town about three Leagues from *Frankfort*. But still the Coast was not clear; and therefore it is prudent to lye still, in order to be at the more Liberty to make a Bustle when the Opportunity is slipt. Accordingly, on *August* the 30th, we find that the last Column of the *French* Army march'd by *Frankfort*. Then all Hands to work. *August* 31, the *H——* Troops had Orders to march—Whither? To *Flan-*
ders: What to do? To join the *Hessians* and *British* and *Austrians*: And what are they then to do? Take the Field to be sure: What take take the Field in the middle of *October*? At the Time when other Armies are leaving it! This is such a Mockery upon all public Sense, that it must appear as incredible, as it is unprecedented, were it not that we have seen it actually happen.

After this succinct and impartial View of the Operations on the Continent, with what View can our Allies think that a Body of *H——* Troops are taken into the Pay of *G——t-B——n*, at a Time when it is absolutely impossible they can be of Service, either to us, or to the Queen of *H——y*? Does this look like carrying on a War upon disinterested, uninfluenced Motives on the Part of *G——t B——n*, the only Encouragement the *Dutch* can have to join us?

Or does it look like gratifying a private Affront, which was not resented, when it might have been resented with Honour and Success on the Part of *Britain*, as well as of those to whom it was more immediately offer'd?

I shall, however, admit, that it is still, notwithstanding all the Oversights that have been committed, and the advanced Season of the Year, in the Power of the Forces of *G——t B——n*, and those of the *Queen of Hungary*, in the *Austrian Netherlands*, to do somewhat decisive in Favour of the Liberties of *Europe*, when joined by 22,000 Auxiliary Troops in the Pay of *G——t-B——n*. But give me leave Sir, to submit it to your Consideration, whether 16000 *H———* Troops, are the proper Auxiliaries, we ought to employ on this Occasion? Whether for the Reasons I have already mentioned, the *Dutch* may not refuse on that very Account to act in Concert with us in any offensive Measures? Whether our taking *H———* into Pay, is not the most impolitic Step the *P——t* of *G——t-Britain* can take? And whether it is not a real weakening of the *Queen of Hungary's* Cause? My Reasons for believing every one of those Propositions in the affirmative are: first, because from the Conduct of a certain *E——te*, The *Dutch* will naturally entertain a Distrust of its acting
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with Vigour in any Scheme that can render *France* its utter Enemy, and the cautious Conduct of that Republic, who, if she draws the Sword at this Juncture, must throw aside the Scabbard, will, it is more than probable, be utterly averse to act offensively in Conjunction with such Allies.

Secondly, tho' the Virtues of his present Majesty, and the tender Regard he has always express'd for the Liberties of *G—t-B—*, will not suffer us to entertain the least Distrust as to his Royal Intentions; yet a wise People, especially, if animated by the Spirit of Liberty, will be cautious how they create Precedents of this Kind: Could the present Royal Family of *G—t-B—* transmit their Virtues, as well as their Power and Dominions to their Posterity, the most Jealous Parliament could be under no Apprehensions of this Kind, but when we reflect upon the use that may be made of this Precedent under a degenerate Reign, one cannot help trembling at the Consequences. In hiring Mercenary Troops from other Powers, the Security generally is, that their Natural Masters will not agree to their acting, but in Consequences of the Design, and upon the Principles, for which they were hir'd. Thus, when the Duke of *Ormond* sign'd the Suspension of Arms which preceded the Peace of *Utrecht*, the Troops that were in the Pay of *Great Britain* refused to follow him

him, and actually join'd Prince *Eugene*, which perhaps fav'd the Army of the Allies, who were not included in the Suspension, from utter Ruin. Many other Instances of this kind might be given. How very different is this from the Case where both Principals and Auxiliaries own the same Prince as their natural Head? For then in case of any Arbitrary Views he may entertain upon the Rights and the Liberty of that Part of his Dominions which is free, he is sure of being assisted with the Forces of the other Part where he is absolute, and who are paid by the very People whom he may design to suppress.

The Forces of *H*—— in themselves are too weak for this Purpose, but when join'd on the Continent by a Body of Mercenaries in our own Pay, what might it not be in their Power to effect, were it not for his Majesty's known Attachment to the Liberties and Interests of *Great-Britain*? There is another Inconveniency, which possibly in a future Reign may arise from our taking *H*——— Troops into our Pay. The King of *G*—— - *B*——, as possess'd of absolute Power in *H*——, must look upon all the Advantages of a good Bargain, to that *E*—— as accruing to his own Pocket. At the same Time as being vested with the executive Power in the Government of *G*——-*t*-*B*——-*n*; it is even his Option to make what Bargain as King of *G*——-*t*
B——-*n*

B——*n* he pleases with the *E*—— of *H*——
——; and the Public my easily judge what
Disadvantages may arise to the People of
Great-Britain from the discretionary Power,
under a Prince less disinterested than his pre-
sent Majesty.

In the last Place I am positively of Opin-
ion, that should *Great-Britain* take 16000
Hannoverians into Pay, it makes a very
great Difference, perhaps that of 32000, in
Prejudice of the Queen of *Hungary*, be-
cause it prevents our hiring from other
Powers an equal Number of Auxiliaries,
who at present either are, or probably will
soon be, in the Pay of the Enemies of that
Princess. As to the Troops of *Hanover*,
they we are always sure never will act in
Prejudice of the common Cause, and—may
be of infinite Service to her *Hungarian*
Majesty in any other Part of *Germany*. We
have already seen the Emperor hire a consi-
derable Body of *Hessians*; can we imagine
that the punctual Pay, and the ready Money
of *Great-Britain*, would not have prevailed
with those very Troops, to embrace the Ser-
vice of the Queen of *Hungary*? We have
heard that the *French* are now actually so-
liciting the *Swiss Cantons*, for taking a
Body of their Troops into their Service;
and that too, upon a very precarious Secu-
rity for their Payment. Can we suppose,
that upon a like Application from this Go-
vernment,

vernment, they would not jump at such a Propofal? But tho' neither of thefe States were to lend us their Forces, would it not be for the Intereft of *Great-Britain* to enter into a clofer Connection with his *Pruffian* Majefty, by taking into our Pay a Body of thofe Troops which he is obliged to be at the Expence of maintaining? Would it not have been a wife Step in our Government to have encouraged the favourable Difpofitions which the Houfe of *Saxony* has all along fhewed for that of *Austria*, by propofing to eafe that Prince, of fome Part of the Expence attending the Body of Forces he is obliged to keep up? But as all thefe Things fpeak for themfelves, I will take my Leave of this ungrateful Subject.

The next Thing I propofe to touch upon, is in a great Meafure connected with what is before, and it relates to our Intereft in fupporting the Houfe of *Austria*. This has been long a favourite Meafure with the People of *Great-Britain*, and fo far as it relates to *Principles and Effects*, it is a wife one; fo far as it relates to *Names and Persons*, it is foolifh. The Pragmatic Sanction is no other than a Mode of Succeffion to an undivided Eftate, in a certain Line; it became the darling Meafure of the laft Emperor and his Father, upon a Family Account, and was ftrengthened by the Acceffion of almoft all the Powers in *Europe*, upon a
Conviction

Conviction that while the Estates of the House of *Austria* remain'd undivided by this Mode of Succession; the Power of that House would still be a strong Barrier against the Ambition of *France*. The Confederacy formed against the Queen of *Hungary*, upon the Demise of the late Emperor her Father, was a strong Proof how little the most sacred Engagements prevail, where Interest or Ambition interpose. The Progress made by this Confederacy is too recent, and too well known for me to describe it here. I will only mention, that when Affairs came to a Crisis in *Germany*, the King of *Prussia* found that he was to be sacrificed by the *French*, who had resolv'd upon his Destruction, and that they had determin'd to give him up to the Queen of *Hungary*. This timely Discovery led him to stand a Battel with the *Austrian* Generals, in which his Cavalry was entirely ruin'd, his Baggage lost, and the Flower of his Infantry destroyed. In short, according to the Accounts publish'd in our own *Gazette*, it was only owing to an Indiscretion too incident to undisciplin'd Troops, that his whole Army was not absolutely cut off, and himself a Prisoner. It is true, he kept the Field of Battle, which the *Austrians* were obliged to relinquish, that as the *French* Army lay at their Back, they might render the Junction betwixt them and the *Prussians* impracticable,

ble, which they actually did. In the mean Time the King of *Prussia* kept close in his Camp, equally afraid of the *French*, as of the *Austrians*; while Prince *Charles* of *Lorrain* was preparing to make a second Attack, which in all Probability would have compleated the Destruction of the *Prussian* Army, and have blasted the Fruits of all the Success, which that Prince had had against the Hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria*. Add to all this, that the *Russian* Minister at the *Hague* had just at this Juncture declared, that his Mistress rather than see her *Hungarian* Majesty oppressed by the Arms of the Confederates, would send 40,000 Men to her Relief.

While Affairs were in this untowardly Situation as to his *Prussian* Majesty, the Court of *Great-B*—— very generously stepp'd in to his Relief, and tho' he before was in no Capacity to have disputed almost any Terms offered him by the House of *Austria*, as being conscious that he had more to fear from the Court of *France* than from the Queen of *Hungary*, yet we very liberally procur'd him an absolute Cession of all *Silesia*, and were Guarantees for his Possession. The World generally thought, that a Treaty so advantageous to him, and so disadvantageous to the House of *Austria*, must have contain'd some Article very much in Favour of the latter; and that he no
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Doubt had engaged himself to act offensively against its Enemies. We were confirm'd in this from the Reasons published by his *Prussian* Majesty, where it appears, that he was fully satisfied of the Treachery of the Court of *Versailles*, and the Necessity he was under of accepting almost any Terms from that of *Vienna*. But the Public was deceiv'd in their Expectations, and they who saw farthest were sensible, that the Politics of his *Prussian* Majesty, never would lead him to hazard the quiet Possession of what he had acquired by the Treaty of *Chastaw*, either by provoking *France* in acting offensively against her, or by assisting the House of *Austria* to recover her Strength, and consequently put her in a Situation to dispute his Enjoyment of what he had acquired by our Mediation. These Conjectures were fortified by what happen'd when *Mallebois* marched, which it is probable he never would have attempted to do, had not the Court of *Versailles* been fully satisfied of his *Prussian* Majesty's Intentions. As I intend to advance nothing as Fact which is founded on Conjecture, I shall forbear making any mention of the Negotiations carried by our Ministers at the Court of *Vienna*, during the important doubtful Siege of *Prague*. It however seems to be pretty evident from the Event of that Siege, that the Obstinacy of the Court of *Vienna*, in refusing all the

Terms of an Accommodation proposed by the Marshals of *France*, was extremely unpolitic, and might have been attended with the entire Ruin of the *Austrian* Interest. I hope the Queen of *Hungary* was not influenced to this Obstinacy by the Councils of any Court, who now professes Friendship to her Family; and the Minister, if any such there be, who advised this unseasonable Obstinacy, must be a Minister whose Views and Measures are extremely dangerous to the true Interest of this Nation. General Maxims of Policy, unless they are accommodated to the Circumstances of Time, Place, and Persons, may shew a Genius for Government, when supported by a controuling Power, but show no Abilities for Council, and no Talents for Management, where Events are doubtful, and where Success may be determin'd by Accidents.

But whatever, Sir, may be in this Speculation, I will venture to say, that had *Prague* been taken, and the Forces of the two Marshals entirely destroyed, the Ecclat of such an Action, and the Success of such a Conduct, would have tempted some of your new Friends to have assumed the Merit of advising the unrelenting, and unforgiving Behaviour of the Court of *Vienna*; and that Obstinacy which is now thought *ridiculous*, would have then been deem'd *politic*. To sum up what I have to say
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on this Subject : It appears, that the Siege was the Cast upon which our M——y here had set their Merits with the Public. They thought, had it succeeded, that Opposition must be reduc'd to its last Pang. In the mean Time, to shut the Mouth of prying Faction, the Cannon of our political Faith was debauch'd, and the Paper which in the Time of the last M——y told only Trifles; under the present, told nothing but — This was a Refinement which might have succeeded, had *Prague* been taken, because the Glory of the Action would have buried in Oblivion all the little Arts that were practis'd to misrepresent it, and the M——y would have triumph'd in the Event. But how did Things turn out? After the Public was kept (*By Authority*) intoxicated for Months together, with continual Expectations of hearing next Post, that *Prague* was taken, and all the *French* with their two Marshalls that were in it made *Prisoners* of War ; After being amus'd with Stories of the vast Numbers which the Besieged had lost, of their being reduc'd to live upon Horses, Dogs, Cats, Rats, Rawhead and Bloody-bones ; and they must be compelled to surrender, or storm'd next Day—*Next Day!* The Siege is rais'd. But these are Matters recent in every Body's Memory; and I will therefore pass to another Quarter,

ter, that I may the sooner finish what I have to say on the Head of Foreign Affairs.

It was a happy Simile which Col. *Titus* made when the Debate was in the House of Commons about excluding the Duke of York. *There is a Lion in the Lobby* Mr. Speaker, *pray shall we shut the Door and keep him out, or shall we let him in, and so turn him out afterwards.* Our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, seems to have very wisely followed the latter Course; they even *suffer'd the Lion to come into the House*, but what they have done to turn him out again, I will leave to your Consideration. The *Spaniards* came into *Italy*, when we might with the greatest Ease have shut the Door against them, and we afterwards caught the Lion by the Tail, in order to turn him out; but instead of that, all we could do, was to pull a few Hairs out of his Posteriors. To speak plainly, I cannot see any manner of Service, or indeed, any Degree of Merit, in Commodore *M—n's* Expedition to *Naples*. I know I am now got upon *the Unpopular Side*, and should be extremely glad of being convinc'd, that I am on the *Wrong Side*, of the Question.

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The false Step, to call it by no harder Name, which we made in suffering the *Spanish* Transports to pass under the Nose of our Fleet, when we cou'd with greatest Ease imaginable have sunk, or taken every Soul on Board, requir'd in Point of Decency, some Attonement. As to the Behaviour of our Sea Officers, I am so far from impeaching it, that I think the Nation never was better serv'd in that Respect, than it now is in the *Mediterranean*, and I believe the Gentleman who was sent before *Naples*, would have acquitted himself like a Man of Honour and Courage, had there been any Room for Action. But I am sorry to observe it, that the Time is not yet over for our brave, honest Sea Officers becoming the Dupes and the Tools in all dirty M—l Jobbs. The Manner in which this Story was told to the World, is extremely Pompous, it has somewhat in it very *Cromwellian*, and is mighty agreeable to those who love to *live o'er the Scenes of Glory*, under the *Edwards* and the *Henrys* of *England*. But the plain Fact appears to have been neither more nor less than this.

Our Minister. just before *Mallebois* marched into *Westphalia*, was heard several Times to declare, That *He had now struck a bold Stroke*

Stroke indeed, and that he hop'd to be easy for ever after: The March of that *Marshal* with the Neutrality that soon follow'd, was too plain a Commentary upon his Words, for the World to doubt by whose Advice, and at whose Instigation this March was undertaken. And I believe a certain R—t H—-ble Person will not disclaim the Share he had in opening the Eyes of some People in his M—y's Councils as to this Particular. Be that as it will, *the Stroke* was not only *bold*, but *masterly*, and had too good an Effect for the Court of *Versailles* not to repeat it. The King of *Naples*, as to Power, was weak; but it was his Interest to save Appearances in serving his Mother: Then how can his Situation be reconcil'd to his Safety? Why, let him be forc'd into a Neutrality, which yet shall leave him at large to serve *Spain*; and let the *English* have the Credit of doing it. “As to a Neutrality, says his *Sicilian* Majesty, I approve of it, and the *English* may take what Merit they please, in forcing me into it; but I am resolved not to be forc'd, *for I'll bite them*, and conclude upon it before their Arms interpose.” You may think that all this is random speaking; but I appeal to the very News-Papers, whether 'tis not what every considering Man will conclude from the whole of this Transaction.

I believe there is not a Man amongst a Million, who does not imagine, that his *Sicilian* Majesty was forced into his Neutrality by Commodore *M—*; but it unluckily appears, from the very first Words of the Letter wrote by *Montalegro* to *Martin*, that *He had already given Orders his Forces should seperate from those of Spain.* And to prove that this was no *Falstaff* Air, as if he would *do nothing upon Compulsion*, the Accounts of the Orders sent to the *Marquis de Castro Pignano*, to withdraw his Forces from those of *Spain*, were published in several of the News-Papers in *Europe*, eight Days at least before Commodore *Martin* appeared with his Squadron before *Naples*.

Well, but still this Neutrality could not have been effected, but by the Terror of the *English* Arms. I am sure I am extremely glad when I hear any Thing that is to the Honour of *Great-Britain*; but I am sorry to see the whole Scheme defeated by a paultry, Jesuitical Evasion. For under the Colour of some Regiments lent by *Spain* to his *Sicilian* Majesty, the *Spanish* Army has been encreased with the Flower of the *Neopolitan* Troops, by means of his sham Neutrality; while his *Sicilian* Majesty quietly enjoys the Benefit of a certain Declaration, said to have been made, *That if*
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he comply'd with the Neutrality, his Dominions should be defended against all Invaders whatever. But whether any such Declaration was made, or if made, whether it had any Effect to the Prejudice of her *Hungarian* Majesty with a certain Monarch who made an unaccountable and precipitate Retreat, just after the Adventure of Commodore *Martin*, and when it was in his Power to have destroyed the whole *Spanish* Army, I shall not presume to affirm *positively*, only I will venture to say, that if it was made, it was extremely unpolitical in the then Situation of Affairs.

As to the Firmness of his *Sardinian* Majesty to the Queen of *Hungary's* Interests, the Merit of which the new Ministry Men arrogate to themselves, I own it has been of very great Service ; but then it was dictated by the Maxims of true Policy which have ever been the Rules of that Monarchs Actions, and therefore I can see no Merit any Ministry has in determining him to the Conduct he has observ'd ; at least, if there be any Room for Praise on that Head, it is due to the old Ministry. However, I think it could require no great Eloquence to induce that Monarch to observe a Conduct, which if he has not observed, all the Favour he had to expect, was that in which
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the *Cyclops* indulged *Ulysses*, That he *should be the last Person he wou'd devour*. But there were other Motives besides, which in Point of Interest were no trifling Considerations, as the Court of *Turin* is situated. Two Hundred Thousand Pounds of *British* Money, with a Pension of 50,000 a Year while the War continues ; and the Cession by the House of *Austria* of the *Pavesan*, and *Vegevenano*, with the Fortrefs of *Pavia* and *Vegevano*, were pretty little Perquisites to an *Italian* Prince, who neither is *encumber'd* with *Dominion*, nor *overflows* with *Money*.

There are several other Points which I might trouble you with as to Foreign Affairs, but as I am afraid they are too rotten to bear handling, I shall not mention them. The Mediation to which his Majesty is invited by the King of *Sweden*, betwixt him and *Russia*, is surely a strong Proof of the high and the just Opinion which that Prince has of his Majesty's Moderation and Justice. And I cannot help wishing, that such a Mark of Regard may have been of no Prejudice of a Prince ally'd to his Majesty's Family by the dearest Tyes. I will only beg leave to observe, a People like the *Swedes*, who are fond of Liberty, *because they have just recover'd it*, or like

the *Dutch*, because they have long possess it, are too apt to be jealous of those within themselves, who are ally'd too nearly to great Power.

Having now fairly laid before you my Thoughts with regard to the Management of Foreign Affairs, by our new Ministers; I leave it to your own Judgment to determine the following Queries, which naturally arise from what I have said.

1st. Whether the new Ministry have taken one proper Step for Humbling *France*, and supporting the House of *Austria*?

2d. Whether there is any Probability of our succeeding in it, without the Concurrence of the *Dutch*, or of their Concurring, while they imagine that the Interests of *Great-Britain* are inseparably look'd with those of a certain E——te?

3d. Whither our taking *H——n* instead of other Troops into pay, will not confirm them in that Imagination?

I now proceed to some Considerations with regard to Domestic Affairs. A Subject that has been so often canvass'd under the late Administration,

niftration, that it is furprizing any thing now fhould fuggelt upon that Head. But alas! this Nation feems to be doom'd as the Liver of *Prometheus* did to the Vultur, to afford immortal Food to the Pen, while the Minifters of Divine Vengeance are preying upon its Entrails. The laft *M——r* like honeft *Sancho*, inftead of exercifing the Difcipline which their Mafters commanded, very archly let all the Lashes fall were they made a mighty Noife, but were not felt either by himfelf or our Enemies; in fhort, no body fmarted but the Nation. This *M——y* feems to copy the Noble *Don* himfelf, by entering into Adventures as impracticable as his of the Windmills. The People are diffatisfy'd; they call out. "Let our Rights at Home be fecur'd, and it will be then Time enough to look Abroad." The *M——y* on the other Hand fay, that this is now no Time for minding any thing elfe, but the Vigorous Profecution of a War, which the Crown has undertaken by Advice of Parliament, and the repeated Voice of the People: Thus ftands the Point, and now the Queftion is, whether the People fhall draw the *M——y* to comply with their Demands, or the *M——y* drag the People to fupport their Projects.

One of the principal Arguments I have heard for the latter is, that the Councils of *Great-Britain* can have no weight Abroad, while so great a Dissatisfaction prevails at Home; *and then Sir, the Danger to the Protestant Interest, and consider Sir, the Safety of the Government* in the Nation. This is indeed, a very *Senatorial* Argument, and comes extremely well from a Fellow perched up amidst the Dependants of his Power, or swelling with the Insolence of his Office. But Sir, I will take the Liberty to talk with you in another Language, I will talk to you in the Language that your Ancestors did to the Crown, at a Time when it perhaps had more Prerogative, *that Shadow of Power*, but certainly not the Twentieth Part of the Power, *substantial* Power, it now possesses. Governments, Establishments, nay, Ministers themselves, are Considerations all of them secondary to that great and first Principle, for which all of them were created in this Nation, *The Safety of the People*. They are indeed the next Considerations, *Longo sed Proximæ Intervallo*; and tho' the present happy Establishment is now part of our Constitution, yet the Constitution it self was meant only to preserve this Original Charter, which has Foundation upon no positive

positive Institution, but exist with our Being. *Non Scripta sed Nata Lex, Quam non didiscimus, accepimus, legimus, sed ex Natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus.* The People therefore must have the better of the Argument, because they reason *a priori*; they only want that the *Effect* should proceed from the *Cause*. This is the Manner in which all wise People will reason. The People of *Rome* were antiently far more *sturdy* in this Point, than the People of *Great-Britain* are now. While they retain'd a Sense of true *Roman Liberty*, they looked upon *Foreign Conquest* as their *Misfortune*, and not their *Glory*, while their Liberties were *precarious* at Home, and chose to submit with *ignominy* to a *weak and despised Enemy in the Field*, rather than Conquer, to strengthen the Hands of their *Tyrants at Home*. This was a Resentment further push'd, than any Thing we met with in the *English* History; I shall however, as a Piece of Curiosity, set down in the Margin a Passage from *Matthew Paris*, which to shew my profound Regard for Government I will not translate, tho' it expresses the Sentiments of an old *English* Parliament, when a Supply or Aid was demanded by King *John*, in the 21st Year of his Reign; while he offer'd that it should
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be put into the Hands of such Persons, as they should appoint to be disburst only, *upon the necessary and urgent Affairs of the Kingdom.* *

The People at present, are far from denying the Supplies that may be necessary for the Support of the Government, either in *their foreign or domestic Measures*, they only think that the Supplies they have granted for these twenty Years past, were misapplied thro' the Corruption of a wicked M——. Since this M—— was displaced, they know they have granted near six Millions of Money; and they are not sensible of any manner of Service it has done, which might not have been as effectually performed by the fourth Part of that Money. They want therefore a constitutional Remedy, which may pluck their Evil up by the Root, and they think that no Success attending the Operations of Government
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* *Indignantēs responderunt, se undique & sæpi gravari promittendo & persolvendo, Afferentes indignum nimis fore & injuriosum permittere Regem, &c. ut a Naturalibus Hominibus suis, quasi a servis ultimæ conditionis in detrimentum Eorum & in alienorum Juramentum, tantam pecuniam tot toties extorqueret Argumentis & inconsulte hostibus Regni distribuit, quod sæpius gravati videbant alienigenas suis bonis saginatas statumque Regni præ paupertate vacillare, & multiplex periculum imminere, nec tamen Thesaurus Regius qui deberet esse Regni Robur & confidentia, senserat merementum.*

can be so *important* as the Neglect of this Remedy may be *fatal*.

This, Sir, I believe fairly and ingenuously to be the Sense of the *People of Great-Britain*, at present. Now, in what Light will such a Dispute appear to Foreigners: To the *Dutch* for Example? Whether will they think it more practicable, or more reasonable, that half a Dozen Men in the M—y universally distrusted by the Nation, should bring a whole People into their Measures, *meerely by crossing them*; or that the People should get the better of the M—y, by insisting on those Rights to which they were born, and without which, Foreign Success would but add to the Weight of M—l Chains: Can our Allies trust a M—y whom their own People distrust? Is this the Means of reconciling their Confidence to our Measures? Is this the Way of regaining their Esteem?

But why did the People call out for this War, if they were resolv'd not to support it? The People, Sir, called out for a *prudent*, a *just*, and an *honourable* War, not for a *romantic*, a *partial*, and an *ineffectual* War. If I should insist upon a Hackney-Coachman carrying me to *Temple-Bar* from

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St. James's, and he shou'd wilfully overturn me at *Charing-Cross* because I wou'd not consent to pay him double Fare, pray wou'd it be a good Plea for the Fellow to put in, *That I obliged him to carry me, and that I must take the Consequences?* Besides, the People have for these twenty Years declar'd, that they wanted a Constitutional Security against P———ry Corruption, and that they cou'd be easy under no Government till they got that. This too was a Lesson inculcated during all that Time, by the very Persons who now are the first to oppose them in their just Demands, and who went farther *within Doors* for that Doctrine in their *Speeches*, than the People have ever yet thought proper to go *without Doors* in their *Addresses*.

I know that Defiances have been thrown out, and Challenges, *to show any one Grievance the People now labours under*, "Grievances, say Gentlemen, formerly proceeded from an undue Exercise of the Prerogative, but the Grievances complain'd of now, are the Acts of the Constitution." The Bounds of this Paper will not allow me Sir, to prove what could be easily done; That the People formerly complain'd of Grievances which were as
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much the positive Acts of the Constitution, as any Penal Law, that now exists is an Act of the Legislature. But that is not the Question at present, the People are not attacking the *Acts of the Constitution*, they are attacking the Abuse of that Power by which the Constitution *may be* perverted from its original Intention, which was the Preservation of their own Liberties and Properties; they wisely think, that if these depend on the personal Virtues either of a Prince, or a Government, they have but a poor and precarious Security for insuring the Possession of either to their Posterity. They think that some Acts of Parliament which are now in Force, were meant only to obviate the immediate inconvenience which the Government lay under, *at the Time they passed*. They are conscious from their own Sentiments of Duty and Loyalty, that these Reasons now cease to exist, and they think it but reasonable, that the Terror should cease likewise.

Let me now put you in mind of what has happen'd very lately. The *Hungarians* and the *Transylvanians*, are at least as much engaged in Point of Interest and Duty to support the House of *Austria*, as we of *Great-Britain* are. And yet they insisted previously to all other Points, upon their

being restor'd to their natural Rights at Home; they demanded, that the Breaches of their Constitution should be healed, and themselves secur'd against all Violations from *wicked Ministers*, or *oppressive Power* for the future. These Points they peremptorily insisted on, even while their Enemies were at their Doors, and ready to destroy the Family to whom they own'd their Allegiance. It was in vain for the *Austrian* Ministers to tell them, that their resisting the Arms of *France* was *fundamentally* right; and that the Points they insisted on should be consider'd afterwards. They laugh'd at the Distinction, they knew of no *Fundamentals* that did not *rest upon the Basis of Liberty*, and gave the Court of *Vienna* to understand, that *Slavery* was as tolerable to them under the Houses of *Bourbon* or *Bavaria*, as of *Austria*. As to *After-considerations*, they wisely thought, that no Time was so proper to consider of these Demands, as when *the Court is pinch'd*, and knew by Experience how impracticable it would be for them to succeed in the most trifling Request, if once the present Exigency was over. In short, they persever'd so wisely, and so *critically*, that they gain'd their Point; the Queen of *Hungary* granted their Demands, she secur'd their Rights, they are now a free People, and have behav'd

hav'd as such. They have fought better *than Slaves* cou'd have done, because they fought to preserve *their Liberties*, and *their Constitution*. After those were secur'd, their assisting their Government with their Lives and Fortunes against *France*, became *fundamentally* right; before that, it wou'd have been but *fortuitously* so, because they might have gain'd by *their Change of Masters*.

The Apprehensions of this Nation are encreased by the Impunity of a Man who has been convicted of more Crimes, than the *Accumulative Guilt* of all *his Predecessors in Government* ever amounted to. They think that this Impunity is an Encouragement, nay, a Sanction for the like future Violations of their Rights and Liberties, and that therefore in Effect, these are so far from being secure, that they are exposed to the Violence of every rapacious Hand who dares invade them.

Was there ever a Time, Sir, when *England* was so tame, under the slavish Doctrines of *Passive Obedience and Nonresistance*, as to sit quiet under such *Calamities*, and *unrepining* bear such *Provocations*. But these Points are too self-evident for me
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to insist on here, I will now apply to *you*, Sir, upon prudential Considerations, which more immediately effect yourself.

Every Man who has any View in Life, proposes to advance either his Reputation or his Interest. You, Sir, was brought into Parliament by the uninfluenced Choice of your Country; and you appear'd then to have the same Sentiments with the People. Your Sentiments are chang'd, those of the People are the same now as then, and they were the same then, as they had been 20 Years before. The Question then is, *Whether you, or the whole People are mistaken.* This is too tender a Point to urge far, but I will venture to say, that no *true Whig*, and I believe at this Day no *sensible Tory* will affirm, that six or eight Men see more, and can judge better, than all the People of *Great-Britain*.

There is one Advantage which they derive from their Constitution, that the Press has hitherto been free, and that they are able to judge of Measures in general, as well as any M——r in *England*. It is not in the Power of any M——r to give them *Alarms abroad*, while they know they are *safe*; it is not in his Power to make them
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believe they are safe at home, while they know they are in Danger. In short, Sir, to abridge this Dispute, I will appeal to one short Fact, in the English History, and will put the Issue of all I have said upon the Truth of that Fact; That there is no Instance in all the Annals of Britain, of any Difference happening betwixt the Ministry and the People, in which the People had not the right side of the Question. Therefore, Sir, if Reputation and an honest Report, are your main Views in Life, as I hope they are, Good sense will direct you to join with the Voice of the People, because Reading and Experience must convince you, that no Man or Minister ever persever'd to differ from them, whose Character does not now Stink in the Nostrils of Fame?

I will now proceed, Sir, to consider how far even your Interest ought to determine you in joining the present Measures of the A——n. Hitherto you have acted in Conformity with the Sentiments of your Constituents, and are as yet without the Merit of being a *Veteran* Tool of Power. And shall you, who are *Vix Scolam ingressus*, you who have not yet labour'd in the Vineyard of M——l Drudgery, expect the Wages that are due to those who have born the
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heat and the burthen of the Day. If you flatter yourself with this, from some late Instances of Promotions without the Merit I speak of, you are deceived. These Instances happened in the Chaos of a Change, while Places and Preferments flew about, without knowing their proper Atmospheres. But the Ferment has now subsided, the Members of the Political Mass must now assume their several Functions, whither they *gravitate slowly towards Liberty*, or *rush precipitately into Bondage*.

The present M——y have now pull'd off the Mask, which from a Sense of Shame, they ought to have worn a little longer, they have beat up for Volunteers, and you appear ready to enlist. But, pray Sir, should you now go over, have you the Vanity to think, that you are of Importance enough to be gratify'd at the Expence of those who deserve better? And should you be gratify'd, with what Face can you return to your old Friends? The last M——r had not, though he wielded the whole Political System of Places, Posts, and Pensions, Gratuities sufficient to keep the whole *Phal-laux* of his Mercenaries *at all Times* firm in one compacted Body; and do you imagine that those People whose Power is no more
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to what *his* was, than a *Monkey* is like a *Man*, will ever be able to come up to your Price, if it exceeds the Importance of a Tide-Waiters Post? You, surely, Sir, are not so blind as not to perceive, that the New M——y depend as much upon the Friends of the late A——n, as the late M——r ever did, and that it would be equally dangerous, and equally impolitical for them, as it wou'd have been for him, to disoblige them. They, who have Posts at present, and do not either lose or resign them, you are sure are *ready, firm* and *impenetrable*; but give me leave to say, they are not *invincible*. For though the principal Band of Mercenaries of the late M——r, who had Posts to lose, were never *disjoin'd*, yet they were *defeated*. *Defeated* by a Party which in its *Infancy* was *feeble, unpromising, and languid*, to the Opposition compar'd now formed; and without even that general and declared Voice of the People to second them, which this Opposition has. Therefore, Sir, your distressed Country calls upon you; she conjures you by your Reputation, the Duty you owe to Posterity, and even by the Considerations of private Interest, to retreat before it is too late; to dash aside, even tho' it should be stretched out, that intoxicating Cup, which is but too apt to turn the

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strongest Brain, and to pervert the soundest Understanding. It is in the Power of your Country, after her Constitution is restored to its Native Vigour, to reward *your* Virtue, with those Honours and those Places which others purchase at the Expence of *Theirs*.

No M—y can be *fundamentally* right, whose Conduct is not guided by the *fundamental* Principles of this Constitution ; It was in order to restore those Principles that every well-meaning Person engaged in the late Opposition. When these are restored a *Foundation* will then be laid, upon which the Interest of the present Royal Family, and the Glory of this Nation, will rise to a lasting Duration. But without these, to talk of *Fundamentals*, is as to talk of *Fundamentals* without a *Foundation*.

I should but ill acquit myself, either to you, or the Public, should I conclude this Address, without putting you in Mind of the Vigorous Struggle made by the late Opposition to the 12,000 *Hessian* Forces taken into *British* Pay, in Consequence of the Treaty of *Hanover*. These alone cost this Nation near Two Millions of Money, without doing it the least Service, and it
appear'd

appear'd from the Bargain made for those Forces, that the *Hiring Foreign Troops* ^{r^s} is in effect a Job by which the M—— is sure of putting a round Sum into his Pockets. For upon a Difference betwixt the Court of *France*, and that of *Denmark*, about the Subsidy to be paid by the former to the latter, a Demand was made in Parliament for 22,694*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* and it appear'd, ^(^a) To the House, that a large Sum had been already most courteously paid by us to the Court of *Denmark*, for that Use, out of the Money granted for the pay of 12,000 *Hessians*, and when it was moved to enquire whither any farther Deductions had been made out of *that Money*, the Motion was prudently rejected. Though this Affair made a very great Noise during the late Opposition, yet I should not all be surpriz'd, from the late Events, to hear that they who were the most violent Declaimers against it *then*, are the most violent Promoters of such another Bargain *now*. But the Nature of *Right* and *Wrong* can never alter, however the Views and Principles of particular Persons may; nor will they who laugh at all public Spirit, find it so easy to

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render

(^a) See the Votes of the House of Commons for that Year.

render it ridiculous to the People of *Great-Britain* as they imagine.

I shall now, Sir, take my Leave of you after putting you in mind that the late M—y, though they dissipated a great deal of Money, yet it generally was kept *within the Nation* ; but at the Rate we are now going on, besides the Million which we have already spent, and which is absolutely lost to this Nation, to no purpose, we are like to be engaged in Schemes of the like Expence. Thus the *little Finger* of this M—ry, is *like to prove heavier than the Loins of their Predecessor*.

This is a Melancholy Consideration to a People already 50 *Millions* in Debt, and likely speedily to have that *Debt* considerably increas'd. But it has been suggested, that even this is not all, for that the Contract for certain Troops in the Pay of *G——t B——n* commenc'd before the End of the last Session of *P——t* ; tho' this I hope, is *without Foundation*, as it seems calculated only to break that Unanimity which ought at present to subsist in the Councils of *G——t B——n*. However I cannot help acquainting you with the Apprehensions which many, who wish well to their

their Country are under, from some late Negotiations said to be set on Foot, betwixt the *French* Ministry and Monf. *Stainville*, who is Resident for the great Duke of *Tuscany* at *Paris*. It is certain, that Court has given it out, that the Preliminaries of such a Negotiation were not only proposed, but *settled* and *agreed* to betwixt themselves and that Minister. It is likewise certain that the Foreign *Gazettes*, of the best Authority, seem to countenance this Report, and it appears that our own C—t are not without Apprehensions of this kind, by the Remonstrances which we have been told our Ministers at the Court of *Vienna* have had Orders to make to her *Hungarian* Majesty. What a shocking Prospect Sir, must it afford, if after all the Dispositions we have shewn, if after the Dissipation of *Seven* Millions of Money, and incurring the Resentment of almost every Power in *Europe*, to assist the House of *Austria*; the Event is to be determin'd by the Firmness of a young Princess, against the Attacks of an artful Husband with a *F—ch* Heart, and of *French* Extraction! This, Sir, I hope will be a proper Consideration for you at Home; and surely nothing can open a more miserable Scene than to see an Army of *British* Troops in the Heart of the Empire; all the other States of *Europe*, either not *daring*, or not *willing*

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willing to Succour them ; and *Great-Britain* it self in the present low state of her Trade, Credit, and Treasure, left *unally'd* and *unpitied*, to combat a *powerful Confederacy*.

I am, S I R,

Y O U R S,

T I N I S.

E R R A T A:

Page 20. Line 1. for Gratifying, read Revenging.

Page 36. Line 18. for Look'd, read Link'd.





